Foreign+Policy+Lecture+Notes

Lecture Notes for Year 3, Foreign Policy
Calendar for Year 3 | Notes from Lectures | Independent Assignments Field Study at Rockefeller Archives

> Was the United States Ever an Isolationist Nation? Part I > Powers in the Constitution > **President. Congress** > Comm-in Chief. Declare War > Treaty Making. 2/3 Senate > Appoint Ambassadors Majority of Senate > Receive Ambassadors Appropriate Funds > //Federalist Papers// written by Hamilton, Madison, Jay > Looked back to historical examples and experience of New Yorkers > //Federalist// 1: if we don't take action to defend ourselves we run risk of destruction - use of the word empire; what in the balance the fate of an our empire (1787) > //Federalist// 10: factions stem from the diversity in the faculties of men; some will be richer than others - debtors and creditors - cannot be eliminated without eliminating freedom. Only thing you can do is try to control their effects so they cannot gain control of government to use it for own ends - might lead to revolution. Particularly a problem in small area so extend the geographic area - bring in many factions. Bankers in Boston cannot control US so will have to find alliances. Majority will have to become more respectful of minority. Pluralism will protect liberty. It justifies existence of US in current form in 1787. Look at page 10, first full paragraph. > //Federalist// 11:deals with external trade - speak with one voice, one navy (Hamilton ) Make the Europeans bid against each other for our market; use our Navy to tip balance of power. Page 16: US being ascendant in American affairs - precursor to the Monroe Doctrine" one great American system." > //Federalist// 14: as transportation improves can expand ever further > //Federalist// 51: need strong executive to counter legislature; other remedy to check legislature - breaking it into two houses > //Federalist// 69: powers of President and checks - power less than King of England or Governor of NY. > Was The United States Ever an Isolationist Nation? Part II > Great involvement from beginning. > **Treaty of Alliance with France.** > > **Jay's Treaty** squeaks through Senate - does the House of Representatives have any role in treaty making process? Only if money is required > Majority of House hated Jay's treaty. Wanted to see instructions so could embarrass the administration - show how little he accomplished. A few minor issues needed funding: men on commissions needed to be paid so that was their entry – George Washington invokes executive privilege and won't turn over documents. Stalemate. > **Pinckney's Treaty** to the rescue, very popular with South and West where Jeffersonians strongest. GW says I won't send this treaty to the Senate unless you pass Jay’s Treaty. Thus Jeffersonians capitulate. > George Washington's **Farewell Address** usually interpreted as a call for isolationism but at same time as he is advising against political connections, he is arguing for commercial relations. Temporary alliances are okay, but we may choose peace or war as our interests require. > Hamilton is the main author. Of the Farewell Address. > Adams: His philosophy: Congress has done nothing therefore he can do nothing. The Executive powerless to act without Congress. The Supreme Court decisions said even actions short of war can only be initiated by Congress. > 1800-1812. Great opportunity to extend commerce during Napoleonic Wars. US gets > embroiled in the conflicts in Europe and that leads to a war - they tried everything but none of them worked. **Madison's War Message** to Commerce bottom of page 30:. > Madison realizes prerogative of Congress - they debated 18 days, only needed simple > majority. Vietnam not the first war that had significant opposition; Revolution, War of 1812 (Hartford Convention), Civil War. . . . > **Monroe Doctrine** > Part of President' annual message. > Background: > Holy Alliance ( Fr, Rus, Prusia, Spain) wants to recolonize Latin America > Russia moving south > British want Latin America to remain independent - trade > British propose they and US make a joint statement; includes provision that neither Great Britain or United States have designs on Latin America themselves. > Only J.Q. Adams, Secretary of State objects - if joint statement "US will be a little cockboat in the wake of the British man of war" - also doesn't want to tie our hands in the future. He persuades Monroe and rest of cabinet to do it ourselves.
 * Introductory Lecture Notes from Professor Tananbaum, Sept. 22, 2011: [|Foreign Policy Notes Tananbaum 9-22-11.docx]
 * Duane Tananbaum Lecture 12-3-2-11
 * Non- colonization . . . American continents closed to European powers
 * Doctrine of two spheres - East (Europe) and West (Americas)
 * Non-interposition (interference) by European monarchies will be considered an unfriendly act toward the US.
 * No status under law just a speech, same in international law. How enforced? British do because it is in their interest.
 * 1830s Falkland Islands seized by Brits, thus Monroe Doctrine worthless.
 * 1904 Theodore Roosevelt Corollary United States is an international police power; now justification for US to intervene to keep European powers out.


 * Anthony Napoli's PowerPoint: Imperialism and Foreign Policy [[file:Imperialism & Foreign Policy.ppt]]

Duane Tananbaum lecture 4-26-2012
 * 1) FDR and the Growth of Presidential Power
 * 2) __U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright__ (1936)
 * 3) Destroyers-Bases Agreement, 1940
 * 4) Lend-Lease, 1941
 * 5) Iceland, 1941
 * 6) __Greer__ Incident, 1941
 * 7) Conclusions


 * 1) Second Chance: FDR, Truman, and U.S. Membership in the United Nations


 * 1) Truman, Congress, the UN, and the Korean War

Picking up after the Destroyers-Bases Agreement:

After his re-election in 1940, FDR began to build up support for Lend-Lease, under which Congress would delegate to the President the authority to order the production of military equipment and set the terms under which that equipment would be transferred to other nations. The U.S. would become the “arsenal of democracy.” FDR used the garden hose analogy: if your neighbor’s house is on fire, you let him use your hose to put it out without haggling over the terms until the danger has passed. Opponents denounced Lend-Lease, asserting that “it makes the President a dictator, and worse, a dictator with the power to take us into war,” but the Supreme Court had clearly ruled in the Curtiss-Wright case that Congress could delegate authority in foreign affairs to the President, as the Lend-Lease bill would do. Congress passed the Lend-Lease bill by huge margins in March 1941.

7/7/41: FDR announced that US troops had landed in Iceland to prevent Germany from occupying it and harassing ships carrying Lend-Lease supplies to England. FDR’s actions were challenged by Sen. Robert Taft (R-OH), who questioned President’s authority to send American soldiers 2400 miles away from US and claimed FDR was usurping Congress’ power to declare war.

The problem of safeguarding Lend-Lease shipments was finally resolved in the aftermath of the Greer Incident in early September, 1941. FDR reported in Fireside Chat, 9/11/41 ([]) that the U.S. destroyer __Greer__ had been the victim of an unprovoked attack from a German submarine while the __Greer__ was on a routine mission delivering mail to U.S. soldiers in Iceland. FDR claimed the German attack was part of deliberate attack by the Germans on the cherished principle of freedom of the seas that could not be allowed to stand. “When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.” Similarly, FDR instructed the Navy to shoot at German ships on sight rather than waiting for them to deliver the first blow. The U.S, Navy would now protect __all__ shipping in the western half of the Atlantic. But like Lyndon Johnson in the Gulf of Tonkin incident, FDR left out crucial pieces of information. The __Greer__ had been tracking the German submarine for more than 2 hours at the request of a British warplane, which had been dropping depth charges at the submarine. The __Greer__ was the same class of ship as those that had been transferred to the British in the Destroyers-Bases Agreement, so it is possible the Germans thought it was a British ship. But not knowing any of this, the American people rallied around FDR’s decision to start convoying British merchant ships in the Western Atlantic and shoot at German ships on sight.

Other encounters ensued in the Atlantic between American and German ships, including the sinking of the U.S.S. __Reuben James__ by a German submarine, with the loss of more than 100 American sailors. Without the consent of Congress, American lives were being lost in an undeclared naval war on the Atlantic.

FDR greatly expanded presidential power, sometime under authority delegated to him by Congress, sometimes acting unilaterally. He recognized before Congress and the American people the threat posed by Hitler and Nazi Germany. But his actions set precedents that later Presidents would follow.

We should spend as much time on success of FDR and Truman in winning approval for U.S. membership in the UN as we do on Wilson’s failure to win approval for U.S. membership in the League of Nations after WW I. Roosevelt and Truman learned from Wilson’s mistakes. They appointed prominent Republicans, including Sen. Arthur Vandenberg (R-MICH) to U.S. delegation to San Francisco. They also used to their advantage the widespread belief that the failure of the U.S. to join the League of Nations had been a major factor leading to WW II, and that U.S. membership in the UN would be a fitting tribute to FDR and to Wilson. The Senate approved the UN Charter with only 2 dissenting votes, reassured that the veto would preserve American freedom of action.

The Korean war marked a high point for the United Nations but a low point for the U.S. Congress when it came to deciding whether the U.S. would intervene in Korea.

In its early years, the UN was usually prevented from acting in a crisis by the Soviet Union’s using its veto power. However, the Soviet Union was boycotting the UN over the organization’s refusal to transfer the Chinese seat to the Communist government, allowing the UN Security Council to ask UN members to come to the aid of South Korea. In the U.S., however, Truman met frequently and consulted widely with his advisors in the executive branch, but he never consulted with members of Congress in a meaningful way in deciding to send U.S. combat troops to Korea. Truman did meet twice with congressional leaders during the first week of the Korean War, but these sessions were to inform them of decisions the President had already made, not to seek their input in a meaningful way. The Truman administration considered submitting a resolution to Congress approving the President’s actions, but the administration decided that a resolution would give its critics an opportunity to criticize American policy leading up to the war, and that such a resolution was not necessary. The State Department compiled a list which included 85 instances when Presidents had allegedly used the armed forces without the approval of Congress, although many of the examples, like President John Adams and the undeclared war with France in the late 1790s, were in fact authorized by Congress. The State Department also cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Curtiss-Wright as clearly establishing the President’s authority to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs without the help of Congress. Like FDR, Truman had now set a precedent that could be used by his successors of committing U.S. troops without congressional approval, although most of them, like Eisenhower in the Formosa crisis in 1955, LBJ in the aftermath of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, and George W, Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq, did go to Congress for a resolution authorizing them to use the armed forces.

KOREAN WAR TIMELINE Saturday night, June 24, 1950 North Korean troops cross 38th parallel into South Korea

Sunday, June 25, 1950 President Truman returns to Washington, meets at Blair House with officials from the State and Defense Departments

United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution calling the North Korean attack “a breach of the peace,” calling upon North Korea to cease hostilities and withdraw to the 38th parallel, and calling upon UN members to assist in executing this resolution

Monday, June 26th A few congressional leaders are briefed on the situation in Korea, but administration officials just repeat what was reported in the press and try to postpone any formal meeting with congressional committees

Truman meets at Blair House with same group as Sunday night Secretary of State Acheson’s recommendations approved: U.S. air and naval support for South Korean forces 7th Fleet to protect Formosa (and prevent Chinese Nationalist attack against mainland) Strengthen U.S. forces in Philippines Increase American aid to French in Indochina President to issue a public statement U.S. to propose a new U.N. resolution calling on members to aid South Korea in repelling the attack and restoring the peace

Tuesday, June 27 President meets with congressional leaders and representatives from Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. President asks Acheson to summarize situation, President reports the orders he has already issued, asks for questions and comments, and emphasizes US acting in support of UN efforts to restore peace. In response to question, President said US now committed, as member of UN in response to Security Council resolutions, to defense of South Korea

UN Security Council passes US sponsored resolution

Tuesday, June 27 – Wednesday, June 28 Discussion in Congress of constitutionality of President’s actions

Thursday, June 29 Military situation in South Korea worsens President meets with Blair House group and decides to increase involvement of US air and naval units to include targets in North Korea Gen MacArthur to survey situation personally and report

Friday, June 30 MacArthur reports that US combat troops are necessary to prevent a rout 5:00 a.m.: President authorizes sending American regiment to Korea from Japan 8:30 a.m.: Blair House group meets; in accordance with MacArthur’s recommendation, President orders 2 divisions moved from Japan to Korea 11:00 a.m.: President meets with congressional leaders, reports on situation and orders he has issued that morning. General approval, but suggestion that President submit to Cong a resolution approving his actions. Truman asks Acheson and State Dept to draft such a resolution (No such resolution ever presented to Congress). Truman’s decision to send US combat troops to Korea announced to press while meeting with congressional leaders going on

July 7, 1950 UN Security Council passes resolution creating unified command in Korea headed by US

September 1, 1950 National Security Council authorizes military operations north of 38th parallel as long as no Russian or Chinese intervention

September 27, 1950 Gen. MacArthur formally authorized to go north of 38th parallel

October 7, 1950 UN General Assembly passes resolution calling for “a unified, independent, and democratic Korea.”

October 24, 1950 American forces cross the 38th parallel, soon approaching Chinese border

November 26, 1950 Communist Chinese troops intervene, pushing UN forces back across 38th parallel

April 1951 President Truman fires General MacArthur

November 1952 Dwight Eisenhower elected President after vowing to go to Korea

Summer 1953 All parties agree to an armistice ending the fighting